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FOCAC: trade, investments and aid in China-Africa relations 
FOCAC is a continuity of China’s central government   political 
agenda towards Africa which seeks to solidify economic, 
political and diplomatic ties. Since 2000, China’s ―go out‖ 
policy has boosted investments and trade in Africa through 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which operate in the 
continent. Such an agenda has been heavily structured via 
ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs-MFA and Ministry of 
Commerce, MOFCOM) and financial institutions (China Exim 
Bank, China Development Bank and China Africa Development 
Fund) to boost trade, investments and aid. 
The ―go global‖ (走出去) policy has driven Chinese investment 
overseas in search of new markets. In 2011, trade between 
China and Africa reached US$ 160 billion (see figure 1) and 
investments totalled more than US$ 13 billion. China today is 
a major trading partner with Africa. More than 2,000 Chinese 
companies (SOEs, joint ventures, private and small and 
medium sized enterprises) have established business in Africa. 
FOCAC has played its role to facilitate these business 
relations.    
FOCAC achievements 2000 to 2009 
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has worked towards 
the establishment of a new global political and economic order 
between China and Africa, aiming to enhancing China-Africa 
economic cooperation. The first FOCAC meeting in 2000 
agreed on a three year action plan to boost Sino-African trade 
and investments; cancelling African countries debts to China; 
increasing development aid to Africa; and encouraging 
Chinese companies to invest in Africa. 
FOCAC II, the first FOCAC meeting in Africa was held in Addis 
Ababa-Ethiopia in December 2003. The increasing number of 
African presidents attending FOCAC II illustrated a rising 
interest on the African continent in Sino-African relations. 
FOCAC II was centred on political cooperation and socio-
economic development. At the Addis Ababa meeting, Chinese 
officials made commitments to open China’s market to African 
exporters and apply tariff-exemption to some products 
exported by African countries to China. To improve bilateral 
economic cooperation, different Chinese and African ministries 
(ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of commerce, ministry of 
international cooperation and ministry of economy) have 
concluded agreements to encourage preferential market 
access for products from Africa into China. Trade agreements 
between African countries and China have been signed.  The 
trade agreements fall into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) framework to harmonise trade policies and participate 
in trade negotiations for better trading system, economic 
growth and sustainable development. 
For trade in services, namely tourism, countries such as 
Mauritius, Kenya, Seychelles, Zambia, Tunisia, Ethiopia and 
Zimbabwe have been granted the Approved Destination 
Status (ADS), allowing Chinese tourists to visit such places. 
Policies to promote the tourist sector and develop tourism 
infrastructure and capacity have been developed by Chinese 
and African tourism officials. As for investments, agriculture 
was one of the most targeted sectors during FOCAC 2003. 
The Addis Ababa action plan (2004-2006) outlined land and 
water resource management, agro-infrastructure 
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development, food security, manufacturing of farm 
machinery; etc. Beijing set up policies to financially support 
companies through MOFCOM and China Exim Bank to develop 
agricultural projects in cooperation with African countries. 
Infrastructure development (a bottleneck for Africa’s 
economic growth) was also part of the agenda at the FOCAC 
II meeting. China has since financed roads and railways 
building in many African countries, thereby contributing to 
their social and economic development. 
In addition, the creation of joint ventures to facilitate 
investment on both sides has been promoted by African and 
Chinese officials. The establishment of joint investment by 
Chinese and African enterprises, and the exchange of 
experience in business management have been the key 
factors in China-Africa economic partnership during FOCAC II. 
Such investment environment should also contribute to job 
creation, ideally bringing about technology transfer and 
capacity building. Beyond the Chinese State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) into Africa’s business environment that 
characterise state-to-state engagement, FOCAC II has also 
considered private and small and medium sized enterprises to 
operate in Africa and China. It is interesting to note that 
China’s central government is facing challenges in attempts to 
control the wave of private entrepreneurs avid of success and 
sometimes driven more by profits than business ethics in 
Africa. In some of these investments, less has been done for 
skill transfer or human resource development of Africans. To 
facilitate business and promote investment cooperation 
between China and Africa, an agreement was signed at 
FOCAC II to establish a China-Africa Joint Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. 
The Special Economic Zones established by China in a 
number of African countries (Nigeria, Mauritius, Egypt, 
Ethiopia and Zambia) could satisfy these needs but apparently 
the expected advantages have not yet been achieved. Instead 
of allowing local entrepreneurs to open businesses in 
respective countries and to ensure economic promotion, the 
SEZs mostly welcome Chinese private and small and medium 
sized enterprises to operate in Africa. 
The 2006 FOCAC meeting in Beijing was a watershed moment – 
at least with regard to public attention. One year after the G8-
Gleneagles summit, Chinese officials made declarations and 
commitments that were ambitious, forming part of a three year 
action plan which mentioned: 
Doubling aid to Africa to reach about US$ 1 billion by 2009 
Establishing a China-Africa Development Fund(CADFund) to 
boost Chinese companies’ investments in Africa 
Providing US$ 3 billion preferential loans and US$ 2 billion in 
preferential buyer’s credits to African countries 
Cancelling debts for 31 African countries 
Opening China’s market for exports to African countries 
Building hospitals and schools in rural areas in Africa  
Such aid falls into the scope of China’s political diplomacy and 
is part of Beijing’s policy to avoid negative public discourse 
and build positive reputation in African countries. 
Commitments and declarations taken during FOCAC I and 
FOCAC II about boosting Sino-African trade and investments 
have yielded satisfactory expectations. From US$ 491.22 
million in 2003, China’s OFDI stock to Africa has reached US$ 
2.5 billion in 2006, thus increasing by 80% (See figure 2 about 
Chinese FDI stock in Africa). In 2004, the total volume of Sino-
African trade amounted to US$ 29.47 billion with China’s 
exports to Africa accounting for US$ 13.82 billion and its 
imports from Africa accounting for US$ 15.65 billion. Such 
growth in trade and investments figures has been possible 
with the policies developed at FOCAC I and II, which have 
enabled Chinese companies to invest in Africa, to open 
markets, to facilitate trade between China and Africa. The zero
-tariff treatment granted to a number of African countries has 
also contributed to fuel Africa’s exports to China. Furthermore, 
2006 coincided with the publication of China’s white paper 
towards Africa that somehow ―formalises‖ China’s engagement 
in Africa.  
Through this policy document, promises to improve China’s 
market access for Africa, increase Chinese investments, 
expand agricultural cooperation and promote infrastructure 
building (transport, telecommunication, power generation) in 
Africa were outlined. 
FOCAC IV was held in Egypt (Sharm El-Sheikh) in November 
2009. Between 2006 and 2009, Sino-African trade has 
experienced a tremendous growth exceeding US$ 100 billion. 
Beijing’s increase of the zero tax treatment grants to many 
African countries to export products to China has favoured 
trade exchanges and contributed to balanced China-Africa 
trade. Chinese exports to Africa reached US$ 50.8 billion and 
imports from Africa totalled US$ 56 billion. At the end of 
Sharm El-Sheikh FOCAC meeting, a declaration to promote  
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open and free trade and investment between China and Africa 
was adopted. Policies to promote and develop small sized 
businesses on both sides were undertaken, e.g. the opening 
of an African commodities trade centre in Yiwu at the world’s 
largest commodities market. As for development assistance,  
loans have been attributed to African countries for 
development projects. 
Challenges  for FOCAC V 
China’s economic rise and modernisation necessitated 
resources from abroad in order to secure development at 
home. China’s footprint in Africa’s natural resources comes 
with social and environmental consequences for people’s 
livelihood in Africa. FOCAC V will look more at China’s next 
round of economic, social and political reforms. How will these 
new implications reshape FOCAC debates? 
Economic shift in China will not only affect its relations with 
Africa but also with the rest of the world. China’s breathtaking 
economic rise with a 9% annual growth rate during recent 
decades will slow to around 7.5% for the coming years. 
Although still impressive, the slump will have repercussions 
for the ability to provide for jobs and income increases 
through growth only. 
China’s stated intention to focus more on a consumption-
driven, rather than export-driven economy will change its 
interests in African countries. In 2006, the governor of the 
People’s Bank of China Zhou Xiaochuan stated that China has 
the financial resources to deal with problems at home. Yet, 
Chinese officials will feel greater pressure to ensure social 
development and alleviate inequalities and wealth disparities 
between people and provinces within China. A rise in social 
protests related to wages and land issues illustrates social 
welfare problems in China. Beijing’s central government is 
aware of the need to address these challenges in order to 
safeguard China’s political, economic and social stability.  
Africa still lacks policies aiming to ensure that Chinese 
investments in the continent are benefitting Africans. In 
previous FOCAC meetings, needs for skills and technology 
transfer were a topic; this will need to be strengthened.  
FOCAC V will need to tackle issues of standards in Chinese 
investments in extractive industries (energy, mining). China is 
increasingly addressing its environmental problems at home, 
improving regulation by publishing white papers and policy 
documents. Less has been done from Africa’s side regarding 
sustainability of Chinese investments in environmentally 
sensitive sectors and areas. FOCAC is one adequate forum to 
set guidelines for more sustainability in Sino-African economic 
relationship. 
Since China’s ―go out‖ policy in the late 1990s and the first 
FOCAC meeting in 2000, Sino-African trade has experienced 
important growth. Today trade between China and Africa has 
reached US$ 160 billion. But problems remain and need to be 
adjusted around FOCAC. Diversification in imports and 
exports is an issue for both sides. The trade imbalances 
between China and Africa are enormous. The major exports 
products to China from Africa are oil, copper, coal and iron 
ore products; consequently, the ten top African countries 
exporting to China are resource- or oil-rich countries (see 
figure 3). On the other hand, Africa’s imports from China are 
mainly based on manufactured products (household 
equipment, motorcycles, footwear, spare parts; see table 1). 
This trend in Sino-African trade benefits China, which enters 
African markets to sell its manufactured goods and buy 
primary products with little added value for Africa. While there 
is an important presence of Chinese companies (SOEs, private 
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Table 1: Composition of exports and imports and share of six top African countries trading with China 
Countries 
Share in  
China-Africa 
trade (in %) 
Exports to China Imports from China 
Angola 21 
Crude oil, diamonds, refined  
petroleum, refined natural gas 
  
Mechanical and electrical products, machinery, construc-
tion material 
South Africa 18 
Diamonds, Iron ore and concen-
trates, copper, platinum 
Cotton, fabrics, woven, footwear, travel goods 
Sudan 7 Crude oil, petroleum gases 
Outer garments and clothing, tubes and pipes, steel, elec-
tronic equipment 
Nigeria 6 
Crude oil, ore, petroleum gases, 
nonferrous base metals 
Footwear, motorcycles, batteries and accumulators, elec-
tronic components, lighting fixtures and fittings 
Egypt 6 Oil, cotton, chemicals, metal products 
Food, equipment, construction material, electronic compo-
nents, electric generators 
Algeria 5 
Mineral fuels, plastic and products, 
copper, cork 
Construction material, mechanical appliances, machinery, 
electronic products, vehicles and parts, ceramic 
Source: MOFCOM and UNCOMTRADE, author’s own calculation (average annual trade 2006-2010) 
  
FOCAC: trade, investments and aid  
 
May 2012 
and SMSE) operating in Africa, China remains untapped for 
African companies, with the exception of a few South African 
companies. African companies will need to start growing into 
the international market, thereby acquiring management skills 
and technology. 
The Chinese side has a well-planned, long term agenda 
regarding their engagement with Africa in different sectors. 
They are not without challenges, though. 2011 and 2012 have 
been tricky years for Chinese investments in Africa. The Arab 
spring caused upheavals in Northern Africa and has seen 
Chinese investments at high risk. In Libya, China’s central 
government had to intervene to repatriate 36,000 Chinese 
citizens and in Egypt and Sudan, groups of Chinese workers 
have been taken hostage. Chinese investments are often in 
high-risk zones not explored by other investors. China will 
probably turn more towards risk management and other 
security measures so as to secure its investments and people in 
Africa. Chinese minister of commerce, Chen Deming, has 
expressed the need to better manage and secure Chinese 
investments in Africa and has mooted the idea of claiming 
compensation from Libya for Chinese companies’ losses during 
the civil war. Undoubtedly, the factors that ―jeopardised‖ 
Chinese OFDI in Africa will be the centrepiece of the debate at 
FOCAC V. 
In order to develop African economies, OFDI is needed. 
China has invested in Africa to sustain its growth and has 
thereby contributed to the economic rise of Africa. China’s FDI 
stock in Africa last year reached more than US$ 13 billion (see 
figure 2). Yet, Chinese OFDI is directed towards Chinese 
multinationals to secure resources, acquire overseas expertise 
and gain new markets. African policymakers still lack a stated 
vision to better engage with China. It is thus somewhat ironic 
that African policymakers turn to China not only for its 
economic development model, investments and trade but also 
for China’s ―efficient bureaucracy‖.  
China has provided development assistance to many 
African countries (debt’s cancellation, hospitals and schools’ 
building, medical aid). Aid contributes to China’s political 
diplomacy strategy within Africa. Aid, however, always comes 
with caveats.  
Recommendations 
Africa needs to take control of its economic development 
path. As enshrined in the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), transparency, corruption and 
governance issues need to be addressed to ensure public 
service delivery to people. This should also be the key agenda 
for FOCAC. From Africa’s side, the cooperation and 
partnership with China should benefit people who mostly 
remain disadvantaged in their livelihoods; increased 
transparency will help ensure the reaching of targeted groups. 
In Sino-African economic cooperation (trade, investments and 
aid), the lack of transparency, corruption and doubtful 
governance performance has been denounced by civil society.  
China should strongly consider these issues in its engagement 
with African countries—also with a long-term view to protect 
its investments assets and citizens in Africa.  
For balanced trade, policies should be developed on both sides. 
With the rising purchasing power among Chinese and a shift 
towards consumer-driven growth in China, opportunities are 
presented to move towards a more balanced trade between 
China and Africa. The establishment of (temporary and 
targeted) protectionist measures to regulate China-Africa trade 
can also contribute to ―fair trade‖. This, however, requires a 
strategic trade policy on the African side.  
To face these challenges, Africa needs to emphasise 
pragmatism in its partnership with China. Country, as well as 
regional level policies should be developed to set priorities to 
achieve through FOCAC V. The African Union Commission - a 
member of FOCAC in its own right – should also undertake 
studies and analysis of African countries’ needs to better 
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